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Two experimental results often reported in support of
perceptual interpretations concerning the influence of set on
perception are critically examined: (a) the relation between
word frequency and recognition threshold, and (b) the
so-called compromise reactions between set and stimulus,
Alter elimination of certain methodological artifacts (e.g.,
introduction of a temporal forced-choice method instead of
the ascending-limits method), both phenomena disappear; the
influence of set on perception appears to be wholly a matter
ofresponse bias.
Howes and Solomon (1951) and Solomon and Postman
(1952) found high negative correlations between frequency
and recognition threshold of English words and nonsense
syllables. Bruner and Postman (1949) obtained much higher
thresholds for incongruous playing cards (e.g., red spades) than
for normal cards (e.g., black spades).
Since the study of Goldiamond and Hawkins (1958) the
explanation of these phenomena in terms of response
probabilities has been widely accepted. The latter interpreta-
tion, however, does not rule out the possibility of genuine
perceptual effects resulting from implicit sets (Dember, 1960).
Zajonc and Nieuwenhuyse (1964) made a further test of the
response bias hypothesis by introducing very stringent
recognition criteria. In this experiment the negative correlation
between frequency and recognition threshold decreased with
increasing stringency of the criterion used (viz., pseudorecogni-
tion, one correct identification and three successive correct
identifications). Nevertheless, even in the most stringent
criterion condition a very reliable effect of word frequency
was found.
These results are complemented by the so-called compro-
mise responses in the playing cards experiment by Bruner and
Postman (1949). For instance, after presentation of
(incongruous) red spades many Ss gave prerecognition answers
such as "brown spades," "purple," "rusty black," "black with
red edges," i.e., names of colors that might be considered
mixtures of red and black.
These two experimental results are repeatedly quoted in
support of perceptual theories concerning set-perception
interactions. In the present study it is hypothesized that they
must be attributed to certain methodological artifacts.
EXPERIMENT I
The word frequency effect was supposed to disappear after
the introduction of the following two procedural modifica-
tions: (a) a temporal forced-choice method for measuring
recognition thresholds, and (b) a very strict recognition
criterion (three successive correct identifications).
Procedure
Nonsense syllables (CVCs) of equal meaningfulness were
used as stimuli. In each trial of the pretraining phase, E
showed one syllable to the Ss (30 undergraduate students)
while asking first to spell and thereafter to pronounce it.
Frequency was varied by presenting some syllables 25, 10, 5,
and 2 times, respectively. For each frequency there were two
syllables. Counterbalancing these syllables against frequency
was not considered essential, first, since their selection was
restricted by the requirement of equal meaningfulness, second,
because the main interest was in the expected interaction
between word-frequency and method of threshold measure-
ment. Twenty-four other CVCs of equal association value were
used as context items in the test phase.
Determination of the recognition thresholds took place in
two ways: the forced-choice method (FC; 15 Ss) and the
ascending-limits method (AL; 15 Ss). In every trial the Ss of
the FC group heard one of the eight focal syllables
pronounced by E. Immediately afterwards, four syllables were
presented in a Bettendorf tachistoscope. Always one of the
items was the focal one, three were context items. The
intervals between the four stimuli within each trial were 2 sec;
after each trial there was a 4-sec pause. Ss were instructed to
indicate after each trial the serial number of the focal syllable.
The recognition thresholds of the AL group were measured by
means of the method of limits. In both groups the exposure
times increased by steps of .00 I sec, starting at a presentation
time of .001 sec. The level of illumination of the pre- and
postexposure tachistoscopic field was 2, that of the stimulus
field 5 lux, as measured at the location of the eyes. The CVCs
(3 x 7 mm) were typed in capitals (Pica) on white cards. The
stimuli subtended a 19 x 56 min visual angle. For the FC
groups the recognition threshold was defined as the exposure
time at which the second correct identification of three
successive correct identifications occurred. For the AL group
one correct response was sufficient. This lenient criterion for
the AL group, as opposed to the strict FC criterion, was
deliberately chosen in order to introduce ample opportunity
for response bias.
Results
The product-moment correlation between recognition
threshold (in milliseconds) and log frequency was found to be
r::: -.97 (p < .005) for the AL group and r > +.19 (n.s.) for
the FC group (cf. Table I). This means that the reported
negative correlation of frequency and recognition threshold,
which we were able to replicate in the AL condition,
completely disappears under perfect control of response bias;
if anything, it gives way to a slight positive correlation under
the FC condition.
Discussion
The rather drastic disappearance of the word-frequency
effect should be interpreted carefully. Inspection of Table I
shows that all FC thresholds are below those of the AL group.
Apparently, the FC Ss needed less information from the
stimulus patterns than the AL Ss. Although, undoubtedly, also
the AL Ss could rely on fragmentary perception of the stimuli.
one can raise the issue whether word recognition actually
Table 1
Mean Recognition Thresholds (Milliseconds) of Four Pairs of Focal
Syllables Measured by Forced-Choice and Ascending-Limits Method
Method Frequency
2 5 10 25
._.~--.~----
Forced-Choice 6.80 7.00 6.50 7.10
Ascending-Limits 26.70 23.50 18.30 11.12
-----
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occurred if only very few features of the syllables (e.g., only
one letter or even parts of a letter) were involved in the task.
This possibility should be checked in further experimentation.
EXPERIMENT 2
In their 1949 article, Bruner and Postman mentioned that
they did not succeed in having the incongruous cards printed
in the "original" red and black colors of playing cards, so that
they had to paint over the normal cards. The colors thus
obtained were, however, not quite accurate: their red was
darker and less yellow-red than on the normal cards. This
induced them to paint over the normal cards as well, so that
the differences in the red color between congruous and
incongruous cards did no longer exist. Covering red hearts and
diamonds with black paint was apparently more successful,
seeing Bruner and Postman did not attempt to modify the
congruous black cards.
Thus, four groups of cards were used: (a) imperfect red
incongruous; (b) imperfect red congruous; (c) almost perfect
black incongruous; and (d) perfect black congruous cards. For
these groups the percentage of color-compromise answers was
63, 32, 12, and 0, respectively. This suggests the hypothesis
that there were, in fact, two sources of incongruity: (a) color
inversion and (b) imperfection of colors, and that many
so-called compromise reactions were indeed correct identifica-
tions (e.g., the response "brown-red spades" after the
presentation of actually dark red spades).
To test this possibility, a replication of the Bruner and
Postman experiment was carried out. However, the colors were
not painted over but printed in the "real" red and black of
playing cards. In this situation, it was supposed, no
compromise reactions would be found.
The replication was exact: the same type and number ofSs
(28 nonpsychology students), the same tachistoscopic expo-
sure times, the same playing cards, etc. (For the properties
of the tachistoscope, see Experiment I.)
The general results of this replication experiment were
extremely consistent with Bruner and Postman's: equal
number of dominance and disruption answers and equal
effects of experience with incongruous cards were obtained.
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However, there was one important difference. In the
replication experiment no compromise reactions were given.
Only one S responded once, "black spades with a shade of
red" on presentation of red spades. But he gave an analogous
response, "black hearts with a shade of red," on presentation
of congruous red hearts. However, in these trials the
presentation times were so short that color perception was
very incomplete. Therefore, this answer cannot be considered
a compromise reaction.
CONCLUSION
Inasmuch as conflicting evidence is absent in the literature,
these findings, if they hold in further experiments, lead us to
conclude that implicit sets have no genuine perceptual effects
and that interactions between set and recognition must be
interpreted wholly in terms of response bias.
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NOTES
I. Address: Psychologisch Laboratorium der Katholieke Universiteit
Nijmegen, The Netherlands. '
2. The first of the two experiments reported in this article was carried
out by M. Brand and F. Verhaaren, and the second one by B. Hermans
and A. Klinkum.
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